Trading and Fat Tails

The Behavior of Speculative Prices
Most changes in speculative prices follow simple time series processes. Indeed, empirical observations by Working (1934) ; Kendall (1953); and Roberts (1959) that changes in various speculative prices appeared to fluctuate randomly preceded the development of a theory to explain why they should (Samuelson, 1965) . The notion that changes in speculative prices respond only to the arrival of new information in an efficient capital market as Fama (1965) and Ross (1989) have argued remains a central tenet of modern financial theory.
The observation by Mandelbrot (1963) that the distributions of changes in many speculative price series were characterized by leptokurtosis (i.e., both peakedness and fat tails) meant that the probability of extreme events was greater than what would exist if security returns were lognormally distributed. Put differently, even extreme price moves should be the result of the market's response to the arrival of new fundamental information in an efficient capital market.
To be sure, there is a considerable literature in financial economics that argues that changes in speculative prices are the result of factors other than the arrival of new fundamental economic information. These factors range from noise (Black, 1986) to the bid/ask bounce (Marsh and Rosenfeld, 1986) to positive feedback and noise trading (DeLong et al., 1989 (DeLong et al., , 1990a (DeLong et al., , 1990a prices in the stock market did not fall very much so that, at one point, the December '87 S&P 500 stock index futures contract was trading at a 50 point discount to the cash index. The huge discount was a result, in part, of the inability to easily do index arbitrage in the wake of the crash.
Extreme Events: October 7, 1998
On Wednesday, October 7, 1998, the dollar fell sharply against the yen. At one point, the dollar was down almost 12 yen or over 9.15% intraday. This is an incredible move for the exchange rate between the currencies of two developed economies. The catalyst for this huge move was simply the unwinding of massive short yen and yen-carry positions by hedge funds and other market participants-and the belief that some major hedge funds were in trouble.
Once again, the rumor of some key traders attempting to unwind a large position sparked a change in the actions and strategies of other traders. Tiger Management-at the time the largest hedge fund in the world-was rumored to have lost over $1 billion on that day from its short yen positions. an explanation for it in the early part of the 20th century. However, his contribution to the literature was largely unknown until the second half of the 20th century.
Introduction
Gold has various roles in the global economy. It is said to be an inflation hedge, a "store of value", and a safe haven. The safe haven means that the asset provides shelter in times of financial turmoil. For example, if negative news hit stocks in a specific country, leading to extreme losses and contagion to other stock markets, a safe haven is supposed to be immune to such an event and not lose its value. More recently, it appears that gold has been subject to increased investment demands evidenced by the extreme price increase from around US$300 to above US$1,900 within a period of 10 years. This price increase is comparable to the bubble in Japanese stocks in the 1980s and the "dotcom" bubble in Nasdaq in the 1990s.
At first blush, it seems that gold has many appealing properties, but can one asset really be all things to all men?
We illustrate that it cannot. Firstly, we show empirically that gold has often not displayed the properties of a store of value or an inflation hedge in the past 40 years. Secondly, using financial theory and a simple thought experiment, we demonstrate that the use of a safe haven asset as an investment or speculative asset weakens the safe haven property or, in extreme cases, destroys it. An empirical analysis fully supports the predictions of the thought experiment. 1
There is a growing literature on gold and safe haven assets (e.g. see Baur and Lucey, 2010; Baur and McDermott, 2010; and Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2010) . To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that analyzes the dynamic role of gold as a safe haven asset and the possibility that Consequently, scenario B can be described as a period in which gold is more integrated and the potential gains from diversification are exploited. 2
In a next step, we assume that there is a shock that negatively affects the prospects and thus the valuations of firms leading to large losses in the (global) stock market.
We further assume that investors face borrowing or funding constraints (e.g. see Boyer, Kumagei and Yuan;
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). However, the main findings also hold without this assumption.
In scenario A, investors react to the negative news by Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, the cross-market re-balancing effect (see Kodres and Pritsker, 2002) asserts that investors respond to shocks in the stock market by readjusting their portfolios and re-evaluating their demand for other assets, including gold. 3 Assuming that an investor's optimal asset allocation is to maintain a constant proportion of their wealth invested in each asset, they will attempt to readjust their portfolios to regain their optimal portfolio weight. 4 In the process of portfolio re-balancing, over-weighted assets are sold and under-weighted assets are purchased, predicting a reduced demand for gold, and downward pressure on gold prices. 5 We note that there will exist a natural time lag between the shock in the stock market and the resulting effect on the gold market since the time until investors' portfolios moved sufficiently out of line to warrant (costly) re-balancing would be strictly positive. However, as more investors hold gold, this time could be expected to shorten.
A second, related, mechanism is the wealth effect (see Kyle and Xiong, 2001) , which states that when investors lose money in one asset, their capacity to bear risk is reduced, resulting in the liquidation of positions in all risky assets, hence reducing pricing in all markets.
Thirdly, the liquidity shock effect (cf. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) could also be at work, in which market participants who need to liquidate a portion of their assets to obtain cash, perhaps due to a call for additional collateral, would choose to liquidate assets in a number of different markets, effectively transmitting the liquidity shock between markets.
Finally, a more behavioural effect, the disposition effect (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) , suggests that investors are reluctant to sell assets which incur losses (they do not want to realize losses), instead choosing to sell assets that have not decreased in value. Since, in scenario B, gold
is not under immediate selling pressure (and is expected to be so due to the safe haven property) investors may choose to liquidate gold instead. This option is not available to investors in scenario A.
All the mechanisms described above would place downward pressure on gold prices in response to a negative shock in the stock market. The implication being that the more people holding gold in their portfolios prior to a shock in the stock market, the more likely mechanisms such as those described above would negatively influence the price of gold and weaken the effectiveness of the safe haven, i.e. shorten the period in which it does not lose its value.
This thought experiment provides testable implications:
(i) gold is an effective safe haven in periods following no significant investment demand for gold and (ii) gold is not an effective safe haven in periods following significant investment demand for gold. We use consistent price changes over a certain period as indication of significant changes in investment demand.
3. Empirical Evidence The Destruction of a Safe Haven Asset? The fact that the price did not fall jointly with the stock market is also consistent with our theory outlined in scenario B, since most of the mechanisms described predict a lagged response of gold price movements to the drop in stock prices. For example, margin calls or portfolio rebalancing, both requiring a sale of gold, would only arise after some time into the crisis.
There It must also be mentioned that the safe haven effect was generally short-lived, i.e. the price of gold does not fall for a relatively short period of time (around 15 trading days) but tends to fall after that (see Baur and Lucey, 2010) . If investors buy gold in response to a negative news shock in the stock market the price of gold increases (strong safe haven effect). If stock prices continue to fall several days after the initial news arrival investors may find themselves in a situation similar to scenario B as described above, since investors would now be holding a significant proportion of gold. In this regard, it could be argued that this effect was always present and that the destruction of the safe haven effect is nothing new. What is new is that the period of 15 trading days is reduced significantly and in some conditions fully eliminated, i.e. reduced to zero trading days.
The finding of a short-lived safe haven effect is also directly linked to the empirical rejection of the store of value hypothesis. If the safe haven effect of gold was a persistent, long-lived, effect, gold would never exhibit a price drop and thus be a store of value.
Finally, an analogy based on the definition of a haven as a "port" and "shelter from the storm" may provide a simpler and perhaps more intuitive illustration of the mechanisms described in this paper. In such an analogy, the increased holding of gold in many investors' portfolios has resulted in most investors now having two boats in operation; one out at sea and susceptible to a financial storm and a second in the port. During times of financial turmoil, the investors (boats) who arrive at the port first are able to seek shelter from the storm and the continued arrival of investors to the port enhance their security further, due to the safety in numbers. However, as the storm begins to ease, those investors with boats still remaining at sea, and now damaged from the storm, must send out their second boat from the port to the aid of the first.
Financial Stability Implications
The existence or non-existence of a safe haven effect has strong implications for financial stability. In scenario A investors do not hold significant fractions of gold in their portfolios and thus cannot sell gold in response to their losses in the stock market. As a consequence gold will not lose its value at a time when global stock markets are in turmoil thereby positively influencing investor sentiment and indirectly stabilizing markets.
In scenario B, investors have incentives (due to portfolio re-balancing or wealth effects) or requirements (due to liquidity constraints) to sell gold following a negative shock in the stock market. This may lead to reduced selling pressure in the stock market. However, this is rather a shortterm effect. When investors realize that the value of the safe haven asset falls (due to the sale of gold) it is likely that this will lead to increased uncertainty and instability.
For example, they may overreact to the falling price in the gold market by selling more stocks or gold potentially increasing volatility in both markets.
The scenarios described in this paper also suggest that there is an impossibility of an effective use of a safe haven Such a strategy is consistent with the way in which many institutional investors operate and supports the existence of a lagged response between a shock in the stock market and (optimal) portfolio re-balancing.
-1
The Destruction of a Safe Haven Asset?
1 In this paper we focus on gold, however our theoretical arguments would work for any safe haven asset subject to increased investment or speculative demand.
2 Note that the safe haven property is not equal to a hedge or (mean-variance) diversification property (see Baur and Lucey, 2010).
3 Note that for non-US investors the role of the US dollar would have an additional effect on the portfolio rebalancing demands since gold is denominated in US dollars. When the US dollar appreciates, gold becomes more expensive to international investors and their demand would decrease, causing gold prices to co-move with the US dollar exchange rate. We do not explore this effect further as the ideas in this paper can be expressed without this additional effect. 4 Appendix A provides details of the assumptions required to ensure that the optimal portfolio allocation for an investor is to maintain a constant proportion of his/her wealth in each asset. These assumptions may not apply to all investors but the idea that one should maintain a constant proportion of wealth in each asset class has permeated modern portfolio theory and is the aim of many institutional money managers.
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Introduction
Nowadays it is considered commonplace to invest abroad. The general liberalization of the financial markets as well as lower costs and improved technology have all provided investors access to more investable assets than ever before. As part of this development, many developed countries have abolished foreign-exchange controls and adopted market-determined floating exchange rates. This gives us a unique opportunity to study cross-country effects in currency risk. In addition, we test for the effect of fixed and floating currency regimes on the pricing of currency risk.
We combine a number of important features in our model. First, our model is based on the mildly segmented asset pricing model which allows for both global and local market risk to affect the pricing of both equity and currency risk. Furthermore, we estimate a conditional version of the pricing model which allows the parameters of the model to be time-varying (in practice market risk premium or beta are unlikely to stay constant over time). In particular, we allow the price of currency risk to differ for the periods before and after the flotation decision. We also utilize a GARCH-M approach to model the time-variation in the conditional (co)variances. In order to estimate the model for six assets jointly, we utilize the multivariate GARCH where the number of parameters is reduced using the Ding and Engle (2001) approach. Finally, we allow for the two countries' expected returns to depend on each other not only through their covariances but also through the prices of risks.
Pricing Currency Risk in Two Interlinked Stock Markets
Including two rather similar, yet in many ways different countries allows also for interesting comparison between the countries. Our primary goal is to explore how the currency risk is priced in these stock markets. In particular, we study the role of the exchange rate mechanism. Second, we also study the differences in the pricing of local sources of risk in Finland and Sweden. The results can shed light on the role of currency risk and local risk on the pricing of stocks in countries that are currently emerging from segmentation and also restricting the free valuation of their currencies. 
Research Methodology
Empirical formulation
Even though the theoretical background of asset pricing models is quite old, the estimation of conditional asset pricing models in practice has been a rather recent development as there are a number of issues that have required further theoretical development as well as computational power.
The first hurdle has been the formulation of the conditional expectations. Typical alternatives have been either using conditioning variables or GARCH-type of models. Here, we combine both approaches. For the conditional (co)variances, we employ a multivariate GARCH-in-mean specification similar to De Santis and Gérard (1998). GARCH models have been commonly used in practice since the 1980s, but when one estimates multivariate models with more than two or three assets, one runs into problems, e.g. with the convergence, despite having an abundance of time series observations
as the number of parameters to be estimated grows exponentially. In our case, we estimate the model using six assets: world, USA, Finland, Sweden, and two currencies.
There are a number of alternative ways to limit the number of parameters. We use the covariance stationary specification of Ding and Engle (2001) which is convenient and reduces the number of GARCH parameters considerably.
Results
Case: Sweden and Finland
Historically, both Finland and Sweden have deployed a fixed exchange rate policy until the 1990s, tying their currencies to gold, the USD, or some exchange rate index. 
Data
It is typical for GARCH studies that a lot of data are needed, typically hundreds of time series observations. In our paper, the estimation is conducted using 474 months of data from March 1970 to August 2009. We take the view of a US investor. Thus, all returns are measured in US dollars in excess of U.S. investors' risk-free return. We use continuously compounded returns.
Global market portfolio returns are proxied by returns on the MSCI global equity market index with reinvested gross dividends. Local market portfolios' returns are calculated from local market indices (USA using the MSCI US index).
As a proxy for the exchange rate risk, we use local bilateral currency exchange rates against the dollar, i.e., USD/FIM or USD/SEK exchange rates for Finnish and Swedish stocks, respectively. Table 1 shows basic descriptive statistics for the assets.
The annualized mean returns for the world equity market and the US market are 9.1% and 9.0%, respectively. Similarly, the corresponding returns for Finland and Sweden are 13.6% and 12.9% per annum. Hence, Finland has offered the highest returns for US investors during the sample period, but in general both Sweden and Finland have offered more than two-times the excess return of the US market. On the other hand, the world and the US market portfolios show clearly lower volatility. 
Empirical Results
Our initial empirical tests concentrate on constant price of risk specifications of the asset pricing model with currency risk. The results show that all three risk factors are relevant for the pricing of stocks in Finland and Sweden.
Next we allow for prices of global, currency, and local risk to be time-varying, with the exception of the price of US local market risk, which is kept constant. Our model also allows the price of currency risk to differ before and after the floating decision in 1992.
The results for the global and local market risk remain basically unchanged. Global and local market risk are priced in both countries. Using the estimated (co) variances, we can also calculate time series values for the beta coefficients. Figure 1 shows the development of the global market betas for all three stock markets. We can see especially in the case of Finland that the sensitivity to global market risk has increased after 1980s.
We find the prices of local risk to be time-varying in Finland but not for Sweden. Somewhat surprisingly, the liberalization indicator is not found to have an impact on the price of the local market risk. This might be related to the fact that the floating decision almost coincides with the liberalization especially for Finland. The currency risk is also clearly priced in both countries, and the price is found to be time-varying. After the floating decision, the price of the currency risk has remained relatively stable (especially for Finland) but notable smaller than before.
Conclusions
The model presented in this paper is suitable for modeling can be in turn used as inputs into the portfolio optimizer.
As circumstances change, the practical applicability of the model can be even further improved by using alternative sets of forecasting variables and/or time series models.
Pricing Currency Risk in Two Interlinked Stock Markets
The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability
Introduction
The debate regarding the impact of financial derivatives on financial sector stability is a long-standing one, but Clearly, the literature shows no conclusive answer to the question whether credit derivatives raise or lower financial stability. Some authors believe that the introduction of credit derivatives increases the stability, while others claim that banks will change their behaviour now that they have access to credit derivatives. In the current study, we empirically investigate the relation between credit derivatives and financial stability, measured by the probability of default of the 20 largest European financial institutions. We find a negative relationship between the financial stability and the increased use of credit derivatives.
Also, credit rating agency Standard & Poor's is found to incorporate CDS positively, but insignificant. In addition, we find evidence that this relationship is progressive and economically meaningful.
Methodology and data characteristics
We will use three different methods of calculating the probability of default: bond spread, CDS spread, and Merton (1974) capital to total asset, the retained earnings to total asset, pre-tax income (earnings before tax) to total assets, the market value of equity to book value of total debt, and the sales to total asset. Greatrex (2008) finds that market data, like implied volatility, can explain deviations in credit spreads. We therefore add the implied volatility of the stock prices into the model as a sixth control variable. The seventh explanatory variable is the variable of interest, the amount outstanding on credit derivative contracts to total assets.
Our sample consists of 20 main players in the European financial sector. We obtain the 20 largest banks in Europe, measured by total assets, using Bureau van Dijk's Bankscope.
In this sample, we include only publicly traded banks. Even though the sample consists of only 20 banks, because of the relative size it provides a fair coverage of the European banking sector. Moreover, the largest banks are obviously of particular interest due to their relatively large impact in the stability, and the fact that they make up the majority of the credit derivative market. The probability of default as calculated with bond spreads shows a pattern that is comparable with that of the overall economy. The probability of default increases during economic downturns (2001 -2002 and 2007 -2008) , In 2008 however the average probability of default using CDS spreads is 2.7%, which is remarkably lower than that of the bond spread. The highest default probability is that of Dexia with 6.7%. Both methods use market data so that one would expect the results to be more or less comparable.
The The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of both the probabilities of default (a) and the control variables (b). A noticeable thing is the relatively high standard deviation of X7, which is the credit derivative variable. The mean is much higher than the median, indicating that a small number of banks uses a large amount of credit derivatives. Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets.
The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability Notes: X1 = working capital to total assets; X2 = retained earnings to total asset; X3 = pre-tax income to total asset; X4 = market value of equity to book value of total debt; X5 = sales to total asset; X6 = implied volatility using at-themoney options; X7 = notional amount of credit derivative contracts to total assets. The numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
Empirical results
The estimation results are presented in Table 4 . In this regression the Z-score of the probability of default is the dependent variable 2 .
Overall, we observe in Table 4 that the use of credit derivatives is detrimental to the stability of the financial institutions. This relation is significant in two cases. The probability of default given by the credit rating agency S&P actually decreases with the use of CDS, although not significantly.
Using the bond spreads, sales to total assets, implied volatility, and our variable of interest credit derivatives to total sales, are significant. In increase in sales to total assets decreases the probability of default. An increase in implied volatility increases the probability of default. The coefficient for X7 is negative, so that an increase in credit derivative positions increases default risk and thus decrease stability.
When focusing on the CDS spreads, there are four significant variables: market value to total debt, sales to total assets, implied volatility, and credit derivatives to total assets. The sign of the coefficient for the sales to total assets is minus, though, which implies that a rise in this ratio increases risk, which is in contradiction with the result from the model using bond spreads. The credit derivative coefficient is again negative.
For the Merton model, only two variables are significant: sales to total assets and the implied volatility. The signs of these variables are consistent with those from the model using bond spreads. The coefficient of the implied volatility, however, is much higher than with the other models.
In this model using the S&P rating, only pre-tax income to total assets is significant; all other variables have high p-values. The credit derivative variable has a positive sign, in contrast to the previous models 3 .
To determine the economic impact of the credit derivative variable on the probability of default, we use our estimated models and calculate the probability of default when the companies would have held one standard deviation more credit derivative contracts and compare them to the probabilities from the original model. An increase in the holdings of credit derivatives with one standard deviation would increase the probability of default of a company with 9.5, 18.2, and 8.5 percent for the bond spread, CDS spread, and Merton model, respectively. These numbers can be considered economically meaningful. S&P reduces the probability of default by 2.5%.
So far we have introduced the credit derivative variable as a linear variable in our model. However, it could be possible that the relationship between the outstanding amount of credit derivatives and the probability of default is non-linear. The probability of default could increase more than proportional due to the leverage embedded in the credit derivatives.
The squared value becomes negative and significant for all three measures. For CDS and Merton, the AIC value decreases, indicating a better fit. This progressive effect of CDS on the probability of default could indicate the initial stabilizing effect, and the subsequent destabilizing effect.
In addition, a possible explanation is the counter party risk.
For S&P the coefficient remains positive, and insignificant;
the fit of the model also deteriorates.
Conclusion
Our results indicate that an increase in the use of credit derivatives increases the probability of default. Therefore, we conclude that an increase in the credit derivatives held by financial institutions reduces the stability of the financial sector. This is even more pressing considering the fact that credit risk instruments are typically only used by large, systemic financial institutions. The magnitude of the impact of credit derivatives on the probability of default of the financial institutions is economically relevant. Results further suggest that the relation between credit derivatives held by financial institutions and the probability of default is not linear, but quadratic. The Effect of Credit Derivatives on Financial Stability
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